Archives for category: Redistricting

Nope.

Despite their continued, self-serving opposition to the 2010 Fair Districts Florida ballot measure, Amendment 6, a majority of voters in both Congresswoman Corrine Brown’s African-American majority-minority district, CD3, and Mario Diaz-Balart’s majority-minority Hispanic district, CD21, supported congressional redistricting reform, with 57% and 62% approval, respectively.

More on the lawsuit, which Brown and Diaz-Balart have appealed to the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals, can be found here.

Florida state senator, Andy Gardiner, might want to bone up on his constitutional law.

The Republican Leader from Orlando was quoted in the Miami Herald that, “If a particular district is at a percentage, I think it’s very important, across the minority district, that it stays within that percentage.”

Of course, Gardiner’s redistricting rationale, which is predicated on “packing” racial and ethnic minorities into so-called “majority-minority” districts, is exactly what a super-majority of Florida citizens, who approved Amendments 5 & 6 in 2010, want to eliminate.

Lowering the percentage of racial and ethnic minorities in legislative districts (both state and federal) is perfectly legal and does not necessarily violate Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act–even the 2006 Voting Rights Act Reauthorization Amendments–which requires the preclearance of voting and election rules in five Florida counties.  The reason is straight-forward: Minorities across the state do not necessarily have a lesser chance of electing minority representatives when the proportion of minorities living in a district is lowered.

In 2003, the Supreme Court of the United States ruled 5-4 in  Georgia v. Ashcroft that shifting African American voters from completely safe majority-minority districts to “coalitional” or “influence” districts, in which blacks did not constitute a majority of voters in a district, was not necessarily “retrogressive.”  That is, the conservative majority ruled that the new federal and state senate legislative districts created by the Georgia state legislature did not violate Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, which prohibits eroding “the position of racial minorities with respect to their effective exercise of the electoral franchise,” in select counties and states, mostly in the South.

Although not all African American and Hispanic elected officials in Florida support “unpacking” majority-minority districts so as to make them less concentrated, which in turn, dilutes the surrounding districts that have higher concentrations of whites, many do.  As the Miami Herald reports, state senator Arthenia Joyner, a black Democrat from Tampa who “was elected to Senate District 18 with a black voting age population of only 39 percent,” responded to Sen. Gardiner’s faux legal analysis: “I don’t need a district with 60 percent black registration to win.”

Senator Gardiner might want to read the court’s opinion in Georgia v. Ashcroft, specifically page 16 of the majority opinion.

The ability of minority voters to elect a candidate of their choice is important but often complex in practice to determine. In order to maximize the electoral success of a minority group, a State may choose to create a certain number of “safe” districts, in which it is highly likely that minority voters will be able to elect the candidate of their choice.  Alternatively, a State may choose to create a greater number of districts in which it is likely–although perhaps not quite as likely as under the benchmark plan–that minority voters will be able to elect candidates of their choice.

The Court continues: “Section 5 does not dictate that a State must pick one of these methods of redistricting over another.”

Florida’s Constitution, however, does. It states, in part

No apportionment plan or district shall be drawn with the intent to favor or disfavor a political party or an incumbent; and districts shall not be drawn with the intent or result of denying or abridging the equal opportunity of racial or language minorities to participate in the political process or to diminish their ability to elect representatives of their choice.

Rather than continuing to pack minorities into lopsided, majority-minority districts, which diminish their voting rights, the Florida legislature should abide by Amendments 5 & 6 and create “coalitional” or “influence” districts across the state that enhance the rights of minorities “to participate in the political process” or “elect representatives of their choice.”

It’s time, Senator Gardiner, for the Florida legislature to listen to the citizens of the Sunshine State, follow the Florida Constitution, and create Fair Districts, rather than ones that excessively pack minorities into overly safe districts.

…in Ghana (West Africa).

For all of you Floridaphiles (or Floridaphobes), don’t worry…I’m working on a paper examining the popular support for Amendments 5 & 6 in Florida.

And for those of you interested in nonpartisan election commissions and the allocation of parliamentary seats in Africa, by all means, plow ahead.

The Re-demarcation and Reapportionment of Parliamentary Constituencies in Ghana

Introduction

In February, 2011, the Ghana Statistical Service (GSS)
released provisional results of the 2010 Population and
Housing Census. All eyes are now on Ghana’s National
Electoral Commission (EC), as it is constitutionally required
to use the new census data to determine the allocation,
demarcation, and apportionment of parliamentary
constituencies in the country. In this essay, I attempt to
address—from an admittedly Americanist standpoint1—
questions pertaining to legislative representation in Ghana.
I argue that the EC is uniquely equipped to carry out its
constitutional duty to prescribe the boundaries of the
country’s parliamentary constituencies, as mandated under
Article 47 of the 1992 Constitution. Yet, as the EC embarks
upon its re-demarcation and reapportionment duties, there
is good reason for Ghanaians of all political stripes to be
concerned. The EC’s decision in 2003 to create 30
additional parliamentary constituencies based on the
boundaries of administrative districts is fraught with unsettling
representational and political ramifications, yet it has not
received the kind of critical scrutiny it deserves.

By no means is this essay an attack on the Electoral
Commission. Since the commencement of Ghana’s 4th
Republic, on a range of contentious issues—from the
maintenance of the voters’ register and distribution of voter
registration cards, to staffing polling stations and tabulating
and announcing the final vote, to current considerations of
overseas voting and biometric ID cards—the Chairman of
the EC, Dr. Kwadwo Afari-Gyan, and the EC staff have
continually stepped up to the challenge. Of course, the EC
is not without its critics. Nevertheless, the EC is the envy of
democracy advocates throughout the sub-region and
beyond, as outsiders recognize the many institutional benefits
of having a permanent, independent, nonpartisan elections
commission overseeing the electoral process.

As a scholar whose nonpartisan interests are informed
by democratic theory and questions of representation,
my concerns with the allocation and demarcation of
parliamentary seats in Ghana today remain as ardent as
when I first broached the topic a decade ago.2 I restrict
my comments here to the EC’s immediate task of
demarcating and apportioning parliamentary seats in
Ghana. I begin with comparative insights on the
redistricting process in the American states, discussing
the partisan task of drawing single-member legislative
districts. I then discuss the EC’s decision in 2003 to
apportion 30 new parliamentary constituencies, using
existing administrative districts—rather than the
“population quota”—as its guiding principle. In doing so,
I analyze how the EC’s rationale may be exacerbating
the problem of malapportioned parliamentary seats. I
use the GSS’s preliminary Census 2010 data, as well as
administrative district data across the 10 regions, to
conduct an analysis of the current distribution of
parliamentary seats in the country. My research reveals
the unequal allocation of parliamentary seats across the
country with respect to their populations. I conclude by
discussing some of the representational and political issues
stemming from the EC’s rationale to use administrative
districts to allocate parliamentary seats.

Full essay available here

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