Archives for category: Direct Democracy

Dr. Carl Klarner has posted “Assessing the Potential Impact of Evenwel v. Abbott” on SSRN.  I look forward to contributing more to this important preliminary analysis of the representational impact of the Evenwel v. Abbott case that SCOTUS hears tomorrow morning, weighing the “one-person, one-vote” principle under the Equal Protection Clause.  Klarner’s analysis shows the potential impact on representation when instead of total population, districts are apportioned based on the number of citizens who live in state and congressional legislative jurisdictions, or, even more narrowly, when districts are apportioned based only on the number of citizens over the age of 18 (CVAP).  His empirical analysis goes beyond recent analyses conducted by Michael Li & Eric Petry at the Brennan Center and by Andrew A. Beveridge, Professor of Sociology at Queens College.  In this iteration, Klarner “assesses the potential impact of such a ruling on the political power of African-Americans, Latinos, individuals residing in poverty, as well as the extent of the electoral advantages a ruling might provide to the Republican Party.” The findings are stark.

Here’s the Abstract:

The U.S. Supreme Court will hear Evenwel v. Abbott on December 8, 2015. If the high Court rules in favor of the plaintiffs, redistricting across the country will be accomplished by nearly equalizing the number of people eligible to vote in a jurisdiction instead of the current standard of nearly equalizing the total population of legislative districts. This analysis assesses the potential impact of such a ruling on the political power of African-Americans, Latinos, individuals residing in poverty, as well as the extent of the electoral advantages a ruling might provide to the Republican Party. It draws on Census data first available on December 3, 2015 and a database of all state legislative elections from 1968 to 2015. It finds that drawing districts on the basis of citizens of voting age would reduce the power of Democratic state legislators by 1.4% in state houses, 1.2% in state senates, and 1.1% in the U.S. House. The representation of Latino state house members would go from 8.4 to 7.4%, 6.7 to 5.8% in state senates, and 6.7 to 5.8% for the U.S. House as well.

 

There seems to be some confusion with respect to the adoption of direct democracy in Arizona as it relates to the March 2, 2015 U.S. Supreme Court oral arguments of Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission.

In 1911, citizens of what would become the state of Arizona were not only very supportive of the initiative and referendum processes, they also supported the recall of judges.  In February, 1911, Arizonians ratified a state constitution with the initiative, referendum, and recall, with nearly 80% approval.  President Taft, however, was no such fan, and in August 1911 he vetoed legislation to make AZ a state because of the judicial recall provision in the AZ constitution.  The judicial recall was subsequently removed by the territorial legislature from the draft constitution. Arizonians ratified the revised state constitution in December 1911, without the recall, with nearly 90% approval at the polls.   Taft approved legislation in February 1912 creating Arizona as the 48th state. The new constitution included both the initiative and referendum.

In 1912, Arizonians amended Section 1, Article 8 of their state constitution, when they adopted a legislative referendum “extending the recall to all public officers of the State holding an elective office, either by election or appointment.”  In that election, men also adopted by a two to one margin a citizen initiative granting women suffrage.

As I mentioned in a post yesterday, the citizen initiative has been used by citizens to adopt numerous election and ethics reforms across the states for more than a century.  Indeed, the first statewide initiative was in 1904, when voters in Oregon overwhelmingly (three to one) adopted a direct primary nominating convention law.

More on the history of the referral by state legislatures and the subsequent adoption of the initiative by citizens during the Progressive Era can be found in my 2008 APSR article, available here.  More on the use of the initiative to adopt statewide election and ethics reforms can be found in my chapter in Bruce Cain, Todd Donovan, and Caroline Tolbert’s 2008 edited volume, Democracy in the States, here

In his review of the oral argument transcript in Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission heard by the U.S. Supreme Court today, election law scholar Rick Hasen writes, “The worst part is that the initiative process is the best way to deal with legislative self-interest in the political process.”

Indeed, it is.

As I write in my 2008 essay, “Direct Democracy and Elections and Ethics Reform,” in Democracy in the States: Experiments in Elections Reform edited by Bruce Cain, Todd Donovan, and Caroline Tolbert (Washington, DC: Brookings), “State legislators are likely to alter institutions so as to keep power and win elections. As such, we should not expect lawmakers to adopt either election or ethics reforms that may diminish their chances of winning and holding office.”  The chapter offers “a comparative and historical examination of the popular adoption and policy impact of a variety of election and ethics ballot initiatives in the American states,” and it also “examines recent efforts by state legislatures to regulate and restrict the use of the initiative.”

 

Because, as Pasco County Supervisor of Elections Brian Corley correctly noted on Monday to Steve Bousquet, “The data provided to us by the Florida Department of State lacked complete, credible and accurate data.”

Yup. Couldn’t agree more.

Here’s my Expert Report in the case, Arcia v. Detzner.

Marc Caputo reports that John Morgan’s Medical Marijuana initiative is sporting a new look as he tries to qualify it for the 2016 ballot.

Will tweaking the wording make a difference?  Perhaps.

But contrary to Morgan’s claim that “turnout wasn’t what it could have been” and that “old people, 65 and older really did us in,” what really hurt Amendment 2 was not the wording of the constitutional amendment or poor turnout, but rather down-ballot roll-off.

As this Figure reveals, support for Amendment (Yellow line) was fairly strong across the state of Florida (it only dipped below 50% in 15 mostly rural counties). The big problem for Morgan and his campaign consultants was ballot roll-off, that is, voters who cast ballots in the gubernatorial race for Democrat Charile Crist (Blue line), but who didn’t vote for legalizing medical marijuana.  Support for Crist in Broward county, for example, topped 70%, and support for Amendment 2 was nearly as high.  The down-ballot roll-off on Amendment 2, however, was 5.3%. Crist tallied 17,000 more votes than Morgan’s Amendment 2 in Broward.  In Miami-Dade county, Crist out-polled Amendment 2 by more than 28,000 votes, as roll-off was 6.7% in the populous South Florida county.  Amendment 2 failed to achieve 60% in Miami-Dade not because of poor turnout, but because of the high roll-off among Crist supporters.  Across the state, roll-off on Amendment 2 was by far the greatest in Broward and Miami-Dade, strongholds for Democrats and support for the legalization of medical marijuana.

Looking forward to 2016, the electoral demographics for Morgan’s retooled medical marijuana ballot measure should be in place in a high turnout presidential election. But limiting ballot roll-off among Democrats–especially peripheral voters who come out every four years–will again be key for the deep-pocketed Orlando trial lawyer.

in Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action. The opinion is available here.

Here are the relevant passages….

Cite as: 572 U. S. ___ (2014)   19
SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

And the costs of qualifying an amendment are significant. For example, “[t]he vast majority of petition efforts . . . require initiative sponsors to hire paid petition circulators, at significant expense.” Segura Brief 10; see also T. Donovan, C. Mooney, & D. Smith, State and Local Politics: Institutions and Reform 96 (2012) (hereinafter Donovan) (“In many states, it is difficult to place a measure on the ballot unless professional petition firms are paid to collect some or all the signatures required for qualification”);

 

20 SCHUETTE v. BAMN
SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

In 2008, for instance, over $800 million was spent nationally on state-level initiative and referendum campaigns, nearly $300 million more than was spent in the 2006 cycle. Donovan 98. “In several states, more money [is] spent on ballot initiative campaigns than for all other races for political office combined.” Ibid.

 

Gronke’s full report is available here

Of particular interest to ElectionSmith readers, this paragraph on page 12:

Two recent articles on the racial impact of voting law changes in Florida, one published in the Election Law Journal (ELJ)21 and the second published in Political Research Quarterly are particularly pertinent to this report. In the first, the authors examined the impact of a new Florida law passed in 2011 that truncated the state’s early voting period and eliminated voting on the last Sunday
before Election Day. The authors reported that “Democratic, African American, Hispanic, younger, and first-time voters were disproportionately likely to vote early in 2008 . . . We expect these types of voters to be disproportionately affected by the recent changes to Florida’s voting laws.”22 The second article followed up on the initial research conducted in the ELJ article. In this second
piece, the authors examine the racial and ethnic composition of the early inperson electorate in Florida using voter registration and voter history files. They show that Black early-in person participation dropped by four percentage points as a consequence of the cutback in early voting, while White early in-person participation dropped less than a percentage point. This difference is not due to changing composition of the electorate.23

 

22 Michael C. Herron and Daniel A. Smith, “Souls to the Polls: Early Voting in Florida in the Shadow of House Bill 1355,” Election Law Journal 11, no. 3 (2012): 331.
23 See Michael C. Herron and Daniel A. Smith, “Race, Party, and the Consequences of Restricting Early Voting in Florida in the 2012 General Election,” Political Research Quarterly (published online Feb. 24, 2014), http://prq.sagepub.com/content/early/2014/02/21/1065912914524831, at Tables 2 & 3.

 

http://www.indiana.edu/~sppc2014/program.html

Want evidence? Start here:

MidtermReviewSheet.Fall2013

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