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One-third of Florida Legislature faces no opposition at polls

Michael Van Sickler reports.

TALLAHASSEE — Millions of voters in Florida will get no vote in choosing who represents them in the Florida House and Senate next year. That’s because the deadline for candidates expired at noon Friday with no challengers qualifying to run against a third of the state Legislature.

The lack of opposition means candidates for eight state Senate seats — all incumbent Republicans — and 38 House seats, all but one an incumbent, automatically won their seats despite no ballots being cast in those districts. That will make 2014 even less competitive than 2012, when 24 percent of lawmakers ran unopposed.

More here.

Florida State Senator Paula Dockery, a Republican from Lakeland, and Representative Richard Steinberg, a Democrat from Miami Beach, have filed companion bills that would permit citizens to “veto” certain bills if signed into law by the governor.  Budgetary and emergency legislation would be exempt from citizen vetoes under Dockery’s Senate Joint Resolution 1490 and Steinberg’s House Joint Resolution 1231. If passed by the state legislature, the legislation would be put forth to the voters in 2012 in the form of a constitutional amendment, which would need 60% + 1 approval for passage.

The popular referendum–which dates to the early 1900s in several states–allows a person or group to file a petition to have a public vote on a bill that the legislature has already approved. Every one of the two dozen states that permit the initiative process also allows citizens to propose popular referendums, except for Florida, Illinois, and Mississippi. The popular referendum, which has been used with more frequency in the past decade, is effectively a public veto of a law. Proponents may qualify popular referendums for the ballot by collecting a certain percentage of signatures in a set amount of time following the passage of the legislation in question. It’s the quintessential “gun behind the door” that allows citizens to keep their elected officials in check.

Despite the popular support for direct democracy in Florida, the political environment at this moment is not very conducive for the state legislature to devolve power to citizens.

I have a 2008 article, “Delegating Direct Democracy: Interparty Legislative Competition and the Adoption of the Initiative in the American States,” that was published in the American Political Science Review with my graduate student, Dustin Fridkin, that investigates the widespread adoption of direct democracy–specifically the citizen initiative–during the early 20th century.  It is available here for download.

From the abstract:

Between 1898 and 1918, voters in 20 American states adopted constitutional amendments granting citizens the power of the initiative. The embrace of direct democracy by voters invites inquiry into why some state legislatures opted to delegate to citizens the power of the initiative, while others did not. Drawing on an original data set, this article uses Event History Analysis hazard models to explain the puzzle of why legislatures might devolve institutional power to citizens. Our longitudinal, macrolevel analysis of socioeconomic and political forces reveals that political considerations—interparty legislative competition, party organizational strength, and third parties—are the most powerful predictors of a legislature’s decision to refer the initiative to the ballot. Although several of our findings comport with the conventional wisdom explaining the adoption of the initiative during the Progressive Era, others are surprising, offering us new theoretical insights into why and when legislative bodies might be willing to divest themselves of their institutional power.

Absent interparty legislative competition in Florida (Republicans are dominant) and the utter lack of third parties in the state, I don’t think the time is ripe for the legislature to place a popular referendum on the ballot. This is unfortunate, as the citizen’s veto–as the popular referendum is often called–has proven to be an effective tool for citizens to use to keep their unrepresentative legislature in check and more responsive to the people.

…in Ghana (West Africa).

For all of you Floridaphiles (or Floridaphobes), don’t worry…I’m working on a paper examining the popular support for Amendments 5 & 6 in Florida.

And for those of you interested in nonpartisan election commissions and the allocation of parliamentary seats in Africa, by all means, plow ahead.

The Re-demarcation and Reapportionment of Parliamentary Constituencies in Ghana

Introduction

In February, 2011, the Ghana Statistical Service (GSS)
released provisional results of the 2010 Population and
Housing Census. All eyes are now on Ghana’s National
Electoral Commission (EC), as it is constitutionally required
to use the new census data to determine the allocation,
demarcation, and apportionment of parliamentary
constituencies in the country. In this essay, I attempt to
address—from an admittedly Americanist standpoint1—
questions pertaining to legislative representation in Ghana.
I argue that the EC is uniquely equipped to carry out its
constitutional duty to prescribe the boundaries of the
country’s parliamentary constituencies, as mandated under
Article 47 of the 1992 Constitution. Yet, as the EC embarks
upon its re-demarcation and reapportionment duties, there
is good reason for Ghanaians of all political stripes to be
concerned. The EC’s decision in 2003 to create 30
additional parliamentary constituencies based on the
boundaries of administrative districts is fraught with unsettling
representational and political ramifications, yet it has not
received the kind of critical scrutiny it deserves.

By no means is this essay an attack on the Electoral
Commission. Since the commencement of Ghana’s 4th
Republic, on a range of contentious issues—from the
maintenance of the voters’ register and distribution of voter
registration cards, to staffing polling stations and tabulating
and announcing the final vote, to current considerations of
overseas voting and biometric ID cards—the Chairman of
the EC, Dr. Kwadwo Afari-Gyan, and the EC staff have
continually stepped up to the challenge. Of course, the EC
is not without its critics. Nevertheless, the EC is the envy of
democracy advocates throughout the sub-region and
beyond, as outsiders recognize the many institutional benefits
of having a permanent, independent, nonpartisan elections
commission overseeing the electoral process.

As a scholar whose nonpartisan interests are informed
by democratic theory and questions of representation,
my concerns with the allocation and demarcation of
parliamentary seats in Ghana today remain as ardent as
when I first broached the topic a decade ago.2 I restrict
my comments here to the EC’s immediate task of
demarcating and apportioning parliamentary seats in
Ghana. I begin with comparative insights on the
redistricting process in the American states, discussing
the partisan task of drawing single-member legislative
districts. I then discuss the EC’s decision in 2003 to
apportion 30 new parliamentary constituencies, using
existing administrative districts—rather than the
“population quota”—as its guiding principle. In doing so,
I analyze how the EC’s rationale may be exacerbating
the problem of malapportioned parliamentary seats. I
use the GSS’s preliminary Census 2010 data, as well as
administrative district data across the 10 regions, to
conduct an analysis of the current distribution of
parliamentary seats in the country. My research reveals
the unequal allocation of parliamentary seats across the
country with respect to their populations. I conclude by
discussing some of the representational and political issues
stemming from the EC’s rationale to use administrative
districts to allocate parliamentary seats.

Full essay available here

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