Archives for category: Redistricting

In his recent post, “A Note on Redistricting Initiatives, Legislatures and the Popular Will,” Bob Bauer notes that redistricting initiatives are not somehow by definition “ill-founded,” as “‘democratic’ interests lie on both sides of this equation.” He’s right, of course. Initiatives are not a panacea for what ails representative democracy in America.

Leaving policy or even normative concerns aside, however, redistricting reform similar to Arizona’s independent redistricting commission is less likely to occur in states without the initiative process.  As this table of election reforms shows (published in “Direct Democracy and Elections and Ethics Reform,” in Democracy in the States: Experiments in Elections Reform), initiative states (both those that use the process and those that have the process) have been more likely than non-initiative states to adopt an independent redistricting commission to draw state legislative seats. Interestingly, though, initiative states have been no less likely to adopt an independent redistricting commission to draw Congressional seats.

The fact that non-initiative states are as likely as those with the initiative process to adopt several election reforms (as the election reform table indicates) is refreshing. But don’t hold your breath for a state legislature to create an independent redistricting commission to redraw legislative districts, except if citizens hold the “gun behind the door,” Woodrow Wilson’s apt description of the threat of the citizen initiative.

There seems to be some confusion with respect to the adoption of direct democracy in Arizona as it relates to the March 2, 2015 U.S. Supreme Court oral arguments of Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission.

In 1911, citizens of what would become the state of Arizona were not only very supportive of the initiative and referendum processes, they also supported the recall of judges.  In February, 1911, Arizonians ratified a state constitution with the initiative, referendum, and recall, with nearly 80% approval.  President Taft, however, was no such fan, and in August 1911 he vetoed legislation to make AZ a state because of the judicial recall provision in the AZ constitution.  The judicial recall was subsequently removed by the territorial legislature from the draft constitution. Arizonians ratified the revised state constitution in December 1911, without the recall, with nearly 90% approval at the polls.   Taft approved legislation in February 1912 creating Arizona as the 48th state. The new constitution included both the initiative and referendum.

In 1912, Arizonians amended Section 1, Article 8 of their state constitution, when they adopted a legislative referendum “extending the recall to all public officers of the State holding an elective office, either by election or appointment.”  In that election, men also adopted by a two to one margin a citizen initiative granting women suffrage.

As I mentioned in a post yesterday, the citizen initiative has been used by citizens to adopt numerous election and ethics reforms across the states for more than a century.  Indeed, the first statewide initiative was in 1904, when voters in Oregon overwhelmingly (three to one) adopted a direct primary nominating convention law.

More on the history of the referral by state legislatures and the subsequent adoption of the initiative by citizens during the Progressive Era can be found in my 2008 APSR article, available here.  More on the use of the initiative to adopt statewide election and ethics reforms can be found in my chapter in Bruce Cain, Todd Donovan, and Caroline Tolbert’s 2008 edited volume, Democracy in the States, here

The League of Women Voters of Florida, etc., et al. v. Ken Detzner, et al., SC14-1905
All the briefs and other documents filed with the Florida Supreme Court are available here.
More documentation, including the four expert reports I produced for the LWV plaintiffs in the case, are available via Justin Levitt’s All About Redistricting.

In his review of the oral argument transcript in Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission heard by the U.S. Supreme Court today, election law scholar Rick Hasen writes, “The worst part is that the initiative process is the best way to deal with legislative self-interest in the political process.”

Indeed, it is.

As I write in my 2008 essay, “Direct Democracy and Elections and Ethics Reform,” in Democracy in the States: Experiments in Elections Reform edited by Bruce Cain, Todd Donovan, and Caroline Tolbert (Washington, DC: Brookings), “State legislators are likely to alter institutions so as to keep power and win elections. As such, we should not expect lawmakers to adopt either election or ethics reforms that may diminish their chances of winning and holding office.”  The chapter offers “a comparative and historical examination of the popular adoption and policy impact of a variety of election and ethics ballot initiatives in the American states,” and it also “examines recent efforts by state legislatures to regulate and restrict the use of the initiative.”

 

Here’s Judge Terry P. Lewis’ (Second Judicial Circuit Court of Florida) decision finding that the Florida Legislature’s congressional map violated the state constitution.

Romo.Final Judgment.July 10, 2014

One-third of Florida Legislature faces no opposition at polls

Michael Van Sickler reports.

TALLAHASSEE — Millions of voters in Florida will get no vote in choosing who represents them in the Florida House and Senate next year. That’s because the deadline for candidates expired at noon Friday with no challengers qualifying to run against a third of the state Legislature.

The lack of opposition means candidates for eight state Senate seats — all incumbent Republicans — and 38 House seats, all but one an incumbent, automatically won their seats despite no ballots being cast in those districts. That will make 2014 even less competitive than 2012, when 24 percent of lawmakers ran unopposed.

More here.

Nope.

Despite their continued, self-serving opposition to the 2010 Fair Districts Florida ballot measure, Amendment 6, a majority of voters in both Congresswoman Corrine Brown’s African-American majority-minority district, CD3, and Mario Diaz-Balart’s majority-minority Hispanic district, CD21, supported congressional redistricting reform, with 57% and 62% approval, respectively.

More on the lawsuit, which Brown and Diaz-Balart have appealed to the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals, can be found here.

…in Ghana (West Africa).

For all of you Floridaphiles (or Floridaphobes), don’t worry…I’m working on a paper examining the popular support for Amendments 5 & 6 in Florida.

And for those of you interested in nonpartisan election commissions and the allocation of parliamentary seats in Africa, by all means, plow ahead.

The Re-demarcation and Reapportionment of Parliamentary Constituencies in Ghana

Introduction

In February, 2011, the Ghana Statistical Service (GSS)
released provisional results of the 2010 Population and
Housing Census. All eyes are now on Ghana’s National
Electoral Commission (EC), as it is constitutionally required
to use the new census data to determine the allocation,
demarcation, and apportionment of parliamentary
constituencies in the country. In this essay, I attempt to
address—from an admittedly Americanist standpoint1—
questions pertaining to legislative representation in Ghana.
I argue that the EC is uniquely equipped to carry out its
constitutional duty to prescribe the boundaries of the
country’s parliamentary constituencies, as mandated under
Article 47 of the 1992 Constitution. Yet, as the EC embarks
upon its re-demarcation and reapportionment duties, there
is good reason for Ghanaians of all political stripes to be
concerned. The EC’s decision in 2003 to create 30
additional parliamentary constituencies based on the
boundaries of administrative districts is fraught with unsettling
representational and political ramifications, yet it has not
received the kind of critical scrutiny it deserves.

By no means is this essay an attack on the Electoral
Commission. Since the commencement of Ghana’s 4th
Republic, on a range of contentious issues—from the
maintenance of the voters’ register and distribution of voter
registration cards, to staffing polling stations and tabulating
and announcing the final vote, to current considerations of
overseas voting and biometric ID cards—the Chairman of
the EC, Dr. Kwadwo Afari-Gyan, and the EC staff have
continually stepped up to the challenge. Of course, the EC
is not without its critics. Nevertheless, the EC is the envy of
democracy advocates throughout the sub-region and
beyond, as outsiders recognize the many institutional benefits
of having a permanent, independent, nonpartisan elections
commission overseeing the electoral process.

As a scholar whose nonpartisan interests are informed
by democratic theory and questions of representation,
my concerns with the allocation and demarcation of
parliamentary seats in Ghana today remain as ardent as
when I first broached the topic a decade ago.2 I restrict
my comments here to the EC’s immediate task of
demarcating and apportioning parliamentary seats in
Ghana. I begin with comparative insights on the
redistricting process in the American states, discussing
the partisan task of drawing single-member legislative
districts. I then discuss the EC’s decision in 2003 to
apportion 30 new parliamentary constituencies, using
existing administrative districts—rather than the
“population quota”—as its guiding principle. In doing so,
I analyze how the EC’s rationale may be exacerbating
the problem of malapportioned parliamentary seats. I
use the GSS’s preliminary Census 2010 data, as well as
administrative district data across the 10 regions, to
conduct an analysis of the current distribution of
parliamentary seats in the country. My research reveals
the unequal allocation of parliamentary seats across the
country with respect to their populations. I conclude by
discussing some of the representational and political issues
stemming from the EC’s rationale to use administrative
districts to allocate parliamentary seats.

Full essay available here

Follow

Get every new post delivered to your Inbox.

Join 1,807 other followers